Resenha do livro de Maria Judith Sucupira da Costa Lins "Educação Moral na Perspectiva de Alasdair MacIntyre".

A plurality of worlds.--The history of oracles and the cheats of the pagan priests.--Discourse concerning the ancients and the moderns.--Selection from Oeuvres.

Can a planetary anthropology cope with both the "provincial cosmopolitanism" of alternative anthropologies and the "metropolitan provincialism" of hegemonic schools? How might the resulting "world anthropologies" challenge the current panorama in which certain allegedly national anthropological traditions have more paradigmatic weight--and hence more power--than others? Critically examining the international dissemination of anthropology within and across national power fields, contributors address these questions and many others.

Considerando que muitos livros desenvolvem nossa capacidade de identificação imaginativa e de disposição para evitar a crueldade, aproveitamos as sugestões de Richard Rorty e utilizamos o romance Lolita, de Vladimir Nabokov, como cenário para a redescrição da crueldade. Cabendo prontamente nos critérios liberais rortyanos de combate à crueldade, esse romance nos possibilita perceber os efeitos que as nossas próprias idiossincrasias privadas podem ter sobre a vida de outras pessoas. Dono de metáforas fortes, vívidas, Lolita nos permite abordar o que chamamos (...) de “a pequena crueldade”, a crueldade que um indivíduo pode infligir a outro sem sequer notar que é cruel. (shrink)

Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility of epistemic akrasia (...) have been criticized by some, I propose instead to make a head-on attack and defend the substantive view that epistemic akrasia is possible — indeed, actual. This leaves for another day the project of diagnosing exactly where the arguments for the impossibility of epistemic akrasia go wrong. Here, I content myself with trying to show that they must go wrong, since — as I will argue — epistemic akrasia is possible. (shrink)

Archaeology and Intentionality explores perhaps one of the most overlooked topics in archaeology, that of intentionality. In archaeology, most explanations of human behaviour rely on intentionality and this book fills a surprising gap in the literature. By identifying the historical trajectory of the notion of intentionality, this book reframes our understanding of what it means to act intentionally and how archaeologists provide explanations concerning past (and present) societies. In general, this book presents a strong framework for archaeological research, one that (...) fits to current archaeological practices and research around the world. This framework considers that past actors were not unconditional free agents, who could act however they wished, nor were they absolute prisoners of the economic, biological, and environmental circumstances in which they lived. From the standpoint of intentionality, it becomes clear that human agency is not about what you can or cannot do, but about what you should, that is to say, actions are above all ethical. In a world wealth inequality runs rampant, where humans have damaged the environment beyond recognition, and where technology advances at an alarming rate - it is important that we recognize our intentions and the ethical responsibility that accompanies those intentions. The book highlights how archaeology is the perfect discipline to understand how and from where those intentions come from. Addressing several problems in archaeological theory and connecting archaeology, philosophy and social theory, this book. (shrink)

Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a (...) threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery. (shrink)

The author- following his own research on the subject- argues that Wittgenstein ignores argumentation theory and in general, the problems of rhetoric and argumentation. From this point of view, he frames Stephen Toulmin’s reading of Wittgenstein, arguing that the British philosopher- who was a student of the Austrian- advocates precisely the same thesis. He explains that this happens in a very peculiar (rhetorical) context on Toulmin’s part; a context in which, in essence, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is being rehabilitated.

In this paper I aim to address--and also to better understand--what is perhaps the most intuitive objection to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that to completely suspend one's judgment is psychologically impossible. I propose to come to an understanding of Sextus's relation to this objection by trying to more clearly understand Sextus's claims about the "Skeptic". I hope to show that it is at least possible for us to understand Sextus and his claims about the "Skeptic" without being driven to either (1) (...) invoke restrictive interpretations of his claims or (2) adopt implausible hypotheses concerning his sincerity. (shrink)

Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do: We would be "insulated" from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique (...) from within. Having given my argument for this claim (which I call the 'continuity argument'), I consider and respond to two important objections. I conclude that the skeptic has a powerful meta-argument to be deployed in defending the legitimacy of his skeptical conclusions against the slings and arrows of (those I call) the half-true theorists. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo discute a questão do percurso plástico do pintor Paul Cézanne e a influência direta vivida por Merleau-Ponty nas fases da fenomenologia e da ontologia selvagem. Para tanto, o referido percurso é sustentado pelo tema da organização estruturante das obras de arte que “lançam” os sujeitos da percepção ao mundo vivido. Na fase fenomenológica mostramos o problema da percepção das imagens a partir das criações romântica e impressionista de Cézanne, pintor moderno, que critica a produção clássica pelo (...) poder de representação da natureza em suas formas “nítidas” e delimitadas, por exemplo, pelas linhas e pelos desenhos, estabelecendo-se, a partir dessa questão, a ultrapassagem do mundo determinado. Em seguida, pretendemos mostrar como a pintura do último Cézanne encontra-se aberta, enquanto pintura “selvagem”, ao sujeito e ao mundo, na condição de envolvimento carnal. Desse modo, passamos a compreender questões fundamentais como: o olhar e a experiência perceptiva; o processo de criação pictórica; a constância e os instantes do mundo; a profundidade, a visão radical e a ontologia selvagem. (shrink)

Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that "hard cases" of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worri-some form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, (...) the specter remains unexorcised. El desacuerdo que encontramos tanto en la historia como en la práctica contemporánea de la filosofía es un fenómeno mal entendido. En este trabajo hago un esbozo y aduzco los motivos del problema del desacuerdo, argumentando que los "casos difíciles" de desacuerdo nos confrontan con un problema sin resolver y al parecer sin posibilidad de resolverse, que pone en duda la racionalidad del discurso filosófico, y con lo cual surge el espectro de una preocupante forma de escepticismo metafilosófico. Examino varias respuestas y tentativas de evasiones, aunque ninguna de ellas es particularmente satisfactoria. Así, el espectro sigue sin ser exorcizado. (shrink)

Tendo defendido a minha tese na USP, em maio de 2011, acerca de o Estudo e a Tradução dos dois livros de Epigramas, de Henrique Caiado, pesquisa acadêmica com mais de 500 laudas, deveras de cunho original e hercúleo, visto que laboramos com poemas epigramáticos renascentistas, nunca antes traduzidos na íntegra para o vernáculo ou para qualquer língua estrangeira. Na presente pesquisa, colocaremos em foco a vida do poeta e os seus possíveis amores. Perguntamo-nos: O que sabemos acerca de um (...) dos poetas mais ilustres e sapientes do período renascentista português? Casou-se? Teve filhos e amantes? Cometia adultérios? Estas são perguntas que tentaremos responder neste artigo. (shrink)

Resumo : O artigo visa a refletir sobre a intriga entre ética e alteridade a partir do Enigma do Rosto do outro. Parte-se do fato de que a visitação do rosto inaugura uma sabedoria mais antiga e mais original do que a do saber e do pensamento provenientes da razão. A partir da relação com o outro e da sabedoria que nasce desse encontro, assiste-se à transformação da semântica da palavra ética. Essa transformação, por sua vez, repercute sobre o significado (...) da educação e da prática que a acompanha. Do mesmo modo, o conteúdo da ética da alteridade associado à Lição do Rosto veicula uma nova concepção de paz. Na tentativa de articular ética e educação à filosofia da alteridade, a paz se propugna como cuidado e responsabilidade pelooutro, bem como justiça e equidade em relação ao terceiro. No contexto da cultura contemporânea, marcada pelo advento da sociedade de indivíduos, a paz se constrói como solidariedade contra a exacerbação do individualismo. Palavras-chaves : Ética. Educação. Alteridade. Linguagem. Sabedoria.: Taking as starting point the face of the other as enigma, this article considers the "intrigue" (entwinement) of ethics and alterity. In this sense, the visitation of the face inaugurates a wisdom that is older and more original than the wisdom obtained by means of reason, i.e., by knowing or thinking. Based on the relation with the other and on the wisdom originated by this encounter, we observe the transformation of the semantics of the word "ethics". On its turn, this transformation has an impact on the meaning of education and also on the meaning of the practice that accompanies education. In the same way, when associated with the Lesson provided by the Face, the content of lterity ethics conveys a new conception of peace. In the attempt of articulating ethics and education with the philosophy of alterity, peace asserts itself as care and responsibility towards the other, and also as justice and equity towards the third one. In the context of contemporary culture, marked by the rising of a society of individuals, peace is built up as solidarity against the exacerbation of individualism. Keywords : Ethics. Education. Alterity.Language. Wisdom. (shrink)

The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical fideism and served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle. Popkin’s landmark History of Scepticism, however, begins its coverage with the Renaissance. In this paper I explore the roots of skeptical fideism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, with special attention to Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the oldest surviving text to clearly develop a skeptical fideist (...) perspective. (shrink)

This article aims to make public part of the research on the concept of ‘light’ in the theological and, above all, liturgical tradition of the Greek Orthodox Church, based on its representation of the concept of ‘hypostasis’. Taking as a point of departure the interpretation of the expression ‘light of light’ [φῶς ἐκ φωτός (phôs ek phōtos)] of the text of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol, the article presents a proposal for the interpretation of the concept of ‘representation’ for this specific case, (...) based on the idea of apomímesis, and applies this concept to a reading of the place of ‘light’ in the Holy Scripture, in the Patrology and in the Greek Eastern Liturgies. (shrink)

Based on Truth and Method I and II, we will present, in this article, the Gadamerian conception of language in the dialogic game. Inspired by classics such as Plato, Aristotle and the later Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer developed Philosophical Hermeneutics as a new perspective to understanding (Verstehen), no longer based on the notion of method, but as a game between the movement of tradition and interpreter. Thus, it is understood that the human being is in a situation, is supported by prejudices (...) and has, therefore, a horizon of meaning, a perspective of reality, although always provisional and limited. Gadamer highlighted the place of the ‘between’ as the true place of hermeneutics. As a defender of dialogue, the construction of a common sense, of agreement, is central to his works, with ‘good will’ and solidarity being crucial attitudes. (shrink)

In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief "Afterword" (...) I argue that the later Wittgenstein (to whom Williams sometimes appeals) would concur with my critique of Williams's antiskeptical efforts. (shrink)

In an earlier paper ("Skeptical Parasitism and the Continuity Argument," 'Metaphilosophy' 2004: 714-732) I suggested that the well-known "plane-spotters" story-first proposed by Thompson Clarke and later developed by Barry Stroud-distorts the very skeptical view it aims to elucidate. However, considerations of space prohibited me from fleshing out my criticisms of the Clarke/Stroud story in that paper. In this paper I aim to fill in this lacuna by showing how the Clarke/Stroud story distorts the skeptic's view. I conclude the paper by (...) briefly sketching the alternative position I endorse and explaining how it avoids the distortions encouraged by the Clarke/Stroud story. (shrink)

This paper argues that the idea of inclusion is linked to the democratic tradition rather than to the republican one. By analyzing the origins and meaning of these two concepts, the author holds that democracy is rather linked to desire and republic to will (and to the expression of desire), and concludes that, since North Atlantic political tradition has not given a key role to desire, democracy, in order to overcome the difficulties it has been encountering in all parts of (...) the world, should take more account of desire and of the social struggles it brings to the fore. (shrink)

O presente artigo brota da constatação de que, desde os sens inícios, com Frege, Russell e Wittgenstein, a filosofia analítica partiu do pressuposto de que Kant era o seu principal inimigo de entre os grandes autores da história da filosofia. Uma vez eliminados o papel fundamental da ideia de um sujeito de conhecimento e o psicologismo que daí se seguia, e reposto no seu devido lugar, quer dizer, depurado de implicações epistemológicas espúrias, o estatuto da lógica como empreendimento radical de (...) fundação da matemática e da ciência de modo geral, Kant foi declarado oficialmente morto. O desenvolvimento da lógica, contudo, cedo mostrou que os problemas fundamentals da filosofia analítica, contra todas as expectativas, continuavam, no essencial, a ser justamente aqueles que tinham ocupado o filósofo de Königsberg na 'Crítica da Razão Pura', sem que se vislumbrasse qualquer solução definitiva ou satisfatória a seu respeito. Assim, na sequência da mais recente historiografia e do seu próprio trabalho sobre o assunto, o autor do presente artigo desenvolve o tratamento da questão no que se refere ao Círculo de Viena, mostrando explicitamente as motivações anti-kantianas desse movimento bem como as origens das mesmas nos primórdios da filosofia analítica. Destacam-se os compromissos e cumplicidade de ambas, jamais confessados ou admitidos pelos respectivos autores, com o kantismo. /// The present article claims that right from its foundations, with Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, analytical philosophy set out from the presupposition that Kant was its principal enemy throughout the history of philosophy. Once eliminated the fundamental role of the idea of a subject of knowledge and the psychologism that followed from it, and returned to its proper place, that is, stripped of illegitimate epistemological implications, the function of logic as a radical enterprise on the foundations of mathematics and of science in general, Kant was declared officially dead. The development of logic, even so, showed early on that the fundamental problems of analytical philosophy, against all expectations, continued, essentially, to be exactly those that occupied the philosopher from Kbnigsberg in the 'Critic of Pure Reason', without any definitive or satisfying solution in sight. Hence, the author of the present article, following the most recent historiography and his own work on the subject, develops this perspective in regard to the Vienna Circle, showing that the anti-kantian motivations of this movement and its origins in the beginnings of analytical philosophy do not preclude compromises and complicities of both with Kantism, a fact that, according to the author of the article, was never confessed or admitted by the thinkers here in question. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell has been traditionallly identified with logical positivism. The author of this paper holds that this identification has no historical basis in Russell's philosophy, and he suggests that, since the logical positivists themselves, it has been used metahistorically and metaphilosophically as an instrument of the legitimacy of analytical practice along the different contexts of analytical philosophy. He shows that when logical positivism emerged in the international scene, during the 1930's, Russell was one of the first philosophers (if not the (...) first), long before the anti-positivist criticism of Popper, Quine, Kuhn an others, to oppose to it and to criticize systematically it from a purely philosophical perspective. Furthermore, he holds that Russell's criticism is an anticipation of the central thesis of contemporary historiography, according to which the most known logical positivists. from the beginning of their career, clearly had an holistic attitude concerning philosophical problems in general. /// Bertrand Russell tern sido tradicionalmente com o positivismo lógico. O autor deste trabalho defende que esta identifiçãc. ao não tern uma base histórica na filosofia de Russell, e sugere que esta, desde os próprios positivistas lógicos. foi usada meta-histórica e meta-filosoficamente como um instrumento de legitimação da prática análitica ao longo dos diferentes contextos da filosofia analitica. Ele mostra que quando o positivismo lógico emergiu na cena internacional, durante os anos trinta, Russell foi um dos primeiros filósofos (senão o primeiro). muito antes das criticas anti-positivistas feitas por Popper, Quine, Kuhn e outros, a opor-se-lhe e a critica-lo sistematicamente de um perspectiva puramente filosófica. Além disso, o autor defende que essa crítica é claramente uma anticipação da tese central da historiografia contemporânea, de acordo com a qual os mais conhecidos positivistas lógicos tiveram. desde o principio da sua carreira. uma atitude claramente holista a respeito dos problemas filósoficos em geral. (shrink)

In this study, we evaluate how individual virtues and inter-organizational management control systems influence buyer–supplier performance through relationship quality. Results from a sample of 232 firms confirm that virtues and IOMCS relate positively to relationship quality and performance, respectively. However, IOMCS lose their positive influence on relationship quality when considered along with virtues. That is, when both variables enter the regression model simultaneously, virtues win. This interesting finding has particular resonance at a time when research on ethics still needs to (...) reinforce its positive effects on the practice of management. (shrink)

Psicanálise e necropolítica no Brasil é o fruto que Tatiana Siqueira Ribeiro foi capaz de produzir desde o solo maltratado dos últimos anos de nossa República. É certo que, desde abril de 2016 até o final de 2022, nosso país viu sua jovem democracia ser posta a perigo. Direitos adquiridos foram revogados, discursos de ódio impulsionaram identificações e laços sociais estruturados a partir disso multiplicaram-se. Esse fatos já escancaravam o risco de morte que grande parte de nossa população – (...) ainda que insistentemente chamada de minoria – corria. Tatiana encontrou sua maneira de lidar coma crueldade que saltava aos olhos daqueles que consideram todo o ser humano digno de direitos. Da dor de encontrar-se com o indizível ela fez palavras. Sorte nossa! (shrink)

Perceptual experience and visual imagination both offer a first-person perspective on visible objects. But these perspectives are strikingly different. For it is distinctive of ordinary perceptual intentionality that objects seem to be present to the perceiver. I term this phenomenal property of experience ‘presence’. This paper introduces a positive definition of presence. Dokic and Martin (2017) argue that presence is not a genuine property of perceptual experience, appealing to empirical research on derealisation disorders, Parkinson’s disease, virtual reality and hallucination. I (...) demonstrate that their arguments fall short of establishing that presence is not perceptual. (shrink)